THREE ESSAYS ON EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC CRISIS RECOVERY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL METHODS APPROACH by Hallren, Ross










THREE ESSAYS ON EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 










SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 
















ROSS J. HALLREN 








THREE ESSAYS ON EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 




A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 













    ______________________________ 
































































© Copyright by ROSS J. HALLREN 2015 
All Rights Reserved. 
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Mitchell Hallren and Dorinda Morris; my 
grandmother, Marilyn Hallren; and my mentor, Daisaku Ikeda. They gave me the 




This endeavor would not have been possible without the support and guidance of my 
committee members: Kevin Grier, Daniel Hicks, Benjamin Keen, Moussa Blimpo, and 
Gary Hoover. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of my classmates: Alex 
Ufier, Trey Trosper, and Michael Walker. Everyone listed here contributed in some 
essential way and ensured that at a critical juncture I was prepared to succeed: Thank 
you. Finally, special thanks to our departmental secretaries, Tami Kinsey and Tammy 
Franklin. They are part of a small group that actually understands how to get things 
done via the OU bureaucracy.  
v 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... iv 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. v 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... x 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ xi 
The Impact of Dollarization and Currency Boards on Income and Inflation: A Synthetic 
Control Analysis ................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 2 
Dollarization in Argentina and Ecuador ..................................................................... 6 
Predicted Policy Effects ....................................................................................... 6 
History of Dollarization in Ecuador & Argentina’s Currency Board ................... 7 
Synthetic Counterfactuals and Inference Testing ..................................................... 10 
Data and Sample ....................................................................................................... 14 
Argentina .................................................................................................................. 17 
Inflation .............................................................................................................. 17 
Real Income ........................................................................................................ 18 
Ecuador ..................................................................................................................... 19 
Inflation .............................................................................................................. 19 
Real Income ........................................................................................................ 21 
Discussion: The Long-Run Sustainability of Dollarization ..................................... 22 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 27 
Tables  ...................................................................................................................... 28 
vi 
Figure  ...................................................................................................................... 35 
To Fix or To Float: Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Pre-Crisis Exchange Rate Regime 
Selection on Post-Crisis Recovery ..................................................................... 42 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 43 
Methodology: Treatment Effect and Endogeneity Bias ........................................... 46 
Data and Estimation ................................................................................................. 49 
Results ...................................................................................................................... 53 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 58 
Breaking the fall: Does Pre-Crisis Exchange Rate Regime Soften the Impact of a 
Currency Crisis ................................................................................................... 74 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 75 
Currency Depreciation & Currency Crises ............................................................... 78 
Theory  ................................................................................................................ 78 
Data/Estimation .................................................................................................. 79 
Results ................................................................................................................ 83 
Currency Depreciation & Stock Market Returns ..................................................... 84 
Theory  ................................................................................................................ 84 
Data/Estimation .................................................................................................. 85 
Results ................................................................................................................ 86 
Currency Crisis & Real Income ............................................................................... 87 
Theory  ................................................................................................................ 87 
Data/Estimation .................................................................................................. 88 
Results ................................................................................................................ 88 
vii 
Currency Crisis & Inflation ...................................................................................... 89 
Theory  ................................................................................................................ 89 
Data/Estimation .................................................................................................. 89 
Results ................................................................................................................ 90 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 91 
Tables  ...................................................................................................................... 93 
References .................................................................................................................... 101 
  
viii 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1 ......................................................................................................................... 28 
Table 1.2 ......................................................................................................................... 29 
Table 1.3 ......................................................................................................................... 30 
Table 1.4 ......................................................................................................................... 31 
Table 1.5 ......................................................................................................................... 32 
Table 1.6 ......................................................................................................................... 33 
Table 1.7 ......................................................................................................................... 34 
Table 2.1 ......................................................................................................................... 61 
Table 2.2 ......................................................................................................................... 62 
Table 2.3 ......................................................................................................................... 63 
Table 2.4 ......................................................................................................................... 64 
Table 2.5 ......................................................................................................................... 65 
Table 2.6 ......................................................................................................................... 65 
Table 2.7 ......................................................................................................................... 67 
Table 2.8 ......................................................................................................................... 68 
Table 2.9 ......................................................................................................................... 69 
Table 2.10 ....................................................................................................................... 70 
Table 2.11 ....................................................................................................................... 71 
Table 3.1 ......................................................................................................................... 93 
Table 3.2 ......................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 3.3 ......................................................................................................................... 95 
Table 3.4 ......................................................................................................................... 96 
ix 
Table 3.5 ......................................................................................................................... 97 
Table 3.6 ......................................................................................................................... 98 
Table 3.7 ......................................................................................................................... 99 
Table 3.8 ....................................................................................................................... 100 
 
x 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Impact of Dollarization/Quasi-Dollarization on Inflation ........................... 35 
Figure 1.2: Within Sample Falsification Check ............................................................. 36 
Figure 1.3: Placebo Test ................................................................................................. 37 
Figure 1.4: Impact of Dollarization/Quasi-Dollarization on Income ............................. 38 
Figure 1.5: Within Sample Falsification Check ............................................................. 39 
Figure 1.6: Placebo Test ................................................................................................. 40 
Figure 1.7: Argentina Fiscal Position ............................................................................. 41 
Figure 2.1 ........................................................................................................................ 72 






My research explores the effect of monetary systems on how quickly developing 
countries recover from economic crises. Existing research typically assumes that 
countries that do not take on a given policy are an appropriate counterfactual for 
countries that do. Often, these two groups of countries are not comparable, and tests of 
this assumption in my research indicate these two groups are, on average, different 
across determinants of the outcomes of interest. Therefore, many established results are 
likely biased. I address these issues of non-random selection of macroeconomic policies 
using quasi-experimental methods, such as propensity score matching, coarsened exact 
matching, and synthetic counterfactuals, to estimate treatment effects. These 
econometric methods allow me to identify control and treatment group countries that 
are observationally similar across relevant factors, and therefore unbiasedly estimate the 
average treatment effect on the treated. 
In my first chapter, I use the synthetic control method (SCM) to estimate the impact 
of official dollarization in Ecuador and quasi-dollarization, in the form of a currency 
board, in Argentina. The SCM is a relatively new econometric technique, developed by 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and it is uniquely suited for evaluating a monetary 
policy, such as dollarization, where the potential treated sample is so small as to make 
traditional econometric techniques ineffective. I show that these monetary arrangements 
were effective at controlling inflation in both countries. Interestingly, in contrast with 
previous research, I find these policies had no impact on real income. Despite the 
success of these policies, Argentina abandoned its currency board in 2002, devalued its 
xii 
currency, and repudiated much of its outstanding government debt causing renewed 
inflation and a loss of significant consumer wealth. Ecuador, conversely, continues to 
operate under dollarization, fourteen years after implementation.  
This line of research is important for policymakers who are considering joining a 
currency union, such as the European Union (EU) or the de-factor U.S. dollar or 
Sterling unions. In particular, my research confirms one must give careful consideration 
to government spending balance and the timing of one’s business cycle with that of the 
other members of the union. One example is Scotland, which in September had 
referendum for independence and if passed, would have formed a de-facto currency 
union with Great Britain or join the EU. Other examples are countries, such as Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Croatia, etc., who are EU member countries but are still debating 
whether to adopt the Euro as their sole legal tender.  
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I analyze the effect of exchange rate 
regime selection on currency depreciation and equity market shocks during a currency 
crisis, using the 1997 Asian financial crisis as a case study. Previous studies on this 
topic find that countries with fixed exchange rates at the onset of the crisis suffered 
significantly greater currency depreciation and more severe declines in equity market 
than countries with flexible exchange rates. I find fixed exchange rate countries and 
floating exchange rate countries are different across several key determinants of 
currency depreciation. After accounting for these differences, I find that a country’s 
exchange rate regime at the onset of the crisis had no impact on how much its currency 
depreciated in 1997 vis-à-vis the USD but did cause stock returns to fall by 
approximately 40 percentage points relative to equity returns in countries with flexible 
xiii 
exchange rates at the onset of the crisis. Moreover, I show the estimate effects of 
exchange rates regimes on currency depreciation and stock market performance during 
the Asian financial crisis vary depending on the type of exchange rate regime 
classification system used to sort countries into treated and control group. 
Finally, using a sample of emerging market and developing countries, I analyze the 
financial consequences of having a fixed exchange rate at the onset of a speculative 
attack or currency crisis. Research typically treats exchange rate regime selection as 
exogenous. However, I find that countries that have a pegged exchange rate before a 
currency crisis are, on average, different from countries with a flexible exchange rate on 
variables that affect the outcomes of interest. After correcting for these differences, I 
find a country’s pre-crisis exchange rate regime has no impact on real income, equity 
returns, or inflation during or immediately following the crisis. This paper contributes to 
the literature by considering all crises and attacks from 1972 to 2003, rather than using a 
case study approach, and by analyzing only the subset of countries that actually 
experience these events. Consequently, these findings are generalizable across all crises 
and better isolate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of having a peg 
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Do political and economic conditions ever become so dire that the optimal decision 
is to surrender control of monetary policy to the United States? In the decade from 1990 
to 2000, two countries, Argentina and Ecuador, decided the answer to this question was 
“yes.” From 1982-1991, annual inflation in Argentina averaged 794% and peaked at 
over 3000% in 1989. Inflation became such a pervasive and damaging problem that, in 
1991, Argentina, under President Carlos Menem, adopted a currency board, with a one-
to-one fixed peg and full convertibility between the Peso and the USD. In the 1990’s, 
Ecuador also failed to control inflation, averaging 44% from 1991-2000. Like 
Argentina, Ecuador opted to tie itself to U.S. monetary policy. Unlike Argentina, 
however, Ecuador chose to dollarize formally in 2000, taking the USD as its official 
currency. 
Prima facie evidence indicates these policies were effective at stabilizing prices. 
Inflation in Argentina averaged 4.2% per-year over the ten years after President Menem 
implemented the currency board, while in Ecuador, prices rose on average 8.6% 
annually in the decade following dollarization. Despite this apparent success, three 
questions remain unanswered. First, did the currency board in Argentina and 
dollarization in Ecuador causally reduce inflation? Second, did these policies reduce 
inflation at the cost of economic growth? Third, despite adopting similar monetary 
arrangements, why did Argentina’s currency board-convertibility system collapse in 
2002 while Ecuador shows no signs of abandoning the dollar? It is not clear that 
traditional economic techniques can generate an unbiased estimate of the impact of 
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dollarization and quasi-dollarization policies because only a handful of countries have 
ever utilized these monetary arrangements. 
In this article, we use the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method (SCM), developed by 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al., (2010) to estimate the treatment 
effect of formal dollarization in Ecuador and quasi-dollarization, in the form of a 
currency board, in Argentina on inflation and real per-capita GDP, over the period 
1980-2010. The SCM is ideal for this type of study because it allows for an estimate of 
the treatment effect of a policy where the sample size of treated countries is so small 
that standard economic techniques are unable to identify a proper counterfactual for the 
treated country. Augmenting the SCM with the Permutation Test (Pitman, 1937a & 
1937b), we find that these monetary arrangements had a statistically significant and 
negative impact on inflation and, in contrast to previous findings, no impact on real per-
capita GDP.  
While neither country faced an inflation abatement-economic growth trade-off, 
Argentina’s currency board proved economically and politically unsustainable, while 
Ecuador’s dollarization arrangement remains in effect today. A number of factors likely 
contributed to the divergent outcomes, including the high unemployment rate and high 
debt levels resulting from Argentina’s lack of fiscal prudence, Argentina’s inflexible 
labor market, and its over-valued exchange rate. We show that dollarization and quasi-
dollarization are effective methods of controlling inflation, but the divergent policy 
persistence implies these monetary arrangements require structural adjustments to the 
labor market that create labor market flexibility and fiscal discipline (Krueger, 2002; 
World Bank, 2010; Blustein, 2005). 
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For developing countries, high inflation can be a particularly worrying problem 
because it is often autocatalytic, easy to start and difficult to arrest, and damaging to 
growth through its effect on consumption and investment behavior (Ghosh & Phillips, 
1998). In cases where, currency devaluation, profligate government spending, heavy 
indebtedness, and loose monetary policy cause high inflation, formal dollarization has 
been suggested as an effective, albeit extreme, solution (Berg & Borensztein, 2000; 
Calvo, 2001).  
A few authors have tested if dollarization or adopting a currency board has a 
statistically significant effect on inflation or real per-capita GDP. Ghosh et al., (1998) 
find that, for the ten countries in their sample with currency boards, inflation under 
currency boards is about 4 percentage points lower than average inflation under other 
fixed exchange rate regime. The effect occurs, they argue, primarily by currency boards 
slowing the growth of the money supply.  They also find economic growth is higher for 
countries with currency boards.
1
 Edwards & Magendzo (2003) find that dollarized 
countries and territories have lower inflation and slower economic growth than non-
dollarized countries, while, Edwards & Magendzo (2006) find no treatment effect of 
dollarization on economic growth but a positive effect of growth volatility.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. (1) We use a 
data driven SCM to generate an appropriate counterfactual for our treatment countries, 
Ecuador and Argentina, thus avoiding the common limitations associated with the small 
sample problem. (2) We estimate the impact of dollarization and quasi-dollarization on 
two medium sized countries. Typically, the previous literature has focused on small, 
                                                 
1
 They caveat their sample is small, most of their currency board countries are island nations, and they do 
not observed a currency board country during a crisis period. 
5 
 
primarily island, nations and territories, limiting the generalizability of the results. (3) 
We provide a series of falsification tests to show that divergence between the outcome 
of interest between a treated country and its counterfactual is due to the treatment and 
not due to some unobserved difference between the two. 
Identification of a proper counterfactual for the treated countries is particularly 
challenging, if not impossible, using traditional econometric techniques, given the small 
sample size. When assessing treatment effect, we would ideally observe the treated 
individual both with the treatment and at the same time without. Since this is impossible 
and dollarization is a policy not randomly assigned to countries, then we must find a 
way to identify a proper counterfactual for the treated country.  The SCM is ideal in this 
case because it offers a data-driven method for constructing a synthetic counterfactual 
for the treatment country using data from countries that never took the treatment. 
Therefore, even though there is no one country that is identical to Ecuador or Argentina 
in factors that affect inflation and real per-capita GDP, except for their currency 
arrangement, the SCM allows for the creation of one from a composite of suitable 
control countries.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the literature on the 
predicted policy effects on inflation and real per-capita GDP and the history of 
Argentina’s currency board and dollarization in Ecuador. Section 3 briefly explains how 
the SCM is used to estimate the treatment effect and describes the data utilized. 
Sections 4 and 5 detail the results of our estimation. Section 6 offers explanations on 
why Argentina’s currency board ultimately failed, while Ecuador’s dollarization 




Dollarization in Argentina and Ecuador 
Predicted Policy Effects 
Aside from the predicted price stabilizing effect of dollarization and quasi-
dollarization, these policies are also predicted to positively affect growth by increasing 
consumption spending by reducing uncertainty regarding government exchange rate 
policy (Mendoza, 2001), increasing financial depth (Nicolo et al., 2005), and increasing 
trade with dollarized countries (Glick & Rose, 2002). In countries that are highly 
liability dollarized, formally dollarizing eliminates currency mismatch risk between 
debt and income (Berg & Borensztein, 2000). This type of mismatch is the reason that 
currency crises often become debt crises. Moreover, given that dollarization limits the 
central bank’s ability to fulfill the role of lender of last resort, commercial bankers may 
become more conservative in their lending practices and thus reduce the probability of a 
banking crisis (Gale & Vives, 2002). 
Given their similarity to currency unions, the optimal currency area (OCA) research 
offers relevant insight into the appropriateness and sustainability of any given currency 
union arrangement. The OCA literature argues the following four criteria are essential 
for a successful currency union (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; and Frankel & Rose, 
1998). First, labor and capital must be mobile across all member countries. Second, 
prices of final products and inputs should be flexible. Third, member countries should 
have similar business cycles or symmetric shocks across the union should dominate 
asymmetric shocks to individual member countries. On this point, Eichengreen (1994) 
argues countries with a large traded sector relative to GDP and with employment spread 
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across multiple sectors would benefit the most from joining a currency union, as a 
country specific or industry specific shock is less likely to have a large, negative impact 
on the economy. Fourth, to offset the impact of asymmetric shocks, there should be an 
automatic fiscal transfer mechanism between member countries. 
Unless these conditions are satisfied, the possible downside of dollarizing or 
adopting a currency board is that Ecuador or Argentina may have business cycles that 
are out-of-sync with the United States’ or may experience local economic shocks. In 
these cases, the United States’ monetary policy will not be appropriate (Berg & 
Borensztein, 2000; Alesina & Barro, 2002). Additionally, the central bank’s ability to 
counteract the effect of a shock via its role as lender of last resort services is more 
constrained (Beckerman, 2001). Under dollarization, the central bank can only provide 
this role up to the amount of dollars it has on hand. Under currency boards, the central 
bank must at all times have enough dollars to cover the monetary base. Therefore, the 
central bank can only act as lender of last resort if it has excess dollars above the 
amount needed to cover the monetary base. 
Unable to absorb shocks through exchange rate or monetary policy, economies will 
adjust primarily through the labor market. Consequently, slowdowns in productivity 
growth will have more immediate and negative impacts (Berg & Borenzstein, 2000). 
Therefore, Ecuador and Argentina may face an inflation abatement-growth trade-off.  
 
History of Dollarization in Ecuador & Argentina’s Currency Board 
 After repeated attempts by President Menem and his predecessors to curb inflation 
and rising government deficits in the 1980’s were thwarted by external shocks and 
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currency crises, in April 1991, President Menem implemented a peso-USD currency 
board in Argentina. The currency board fixed the Argentine peso at a one-to-one peg 
with the USD, with the peso convertible on demand to the USD at the fixed exchange 
rate. Many felt the currency board-convertibility system would act as a credible fixed 
exchange rate and provide an anchor of expansionary monetary policy in Argentina. 
(See World Bank, 2003 and Blustein, 2005) Theoretically, this type of system should 
have the same inflation curbing features of dollarization, but; unlike dollarization, a 
government can more easily unwind a currency board.  
 As in Argentina, the decision to dollarize in Ecuador was a final attempt to arrest 
rising prices and stabilize an economy in crisis. From 1998 through early 2000, Ecuador 
suffered one of the most severe economic crises of its history. In 1999, the banking 
system collapsed with 40% of banks failing, the government defaulted on its debt, and 
consumers and investor lost all confidence in the Sucre, Ecuador’s currency, resulting in 
a massive sell-off. This flight from the Sucre generated uncontrollable hyperinflation, 
peaking at 30% per month. Estimates place the cost of the crisis at 20% of 2000 GDP. 
An inability to maintain fiscal discipline resulted in a highly indebted central 
government with an external debt of 106% of GDP in 1999. In the wake of the Tequila 
Crisis, financial capital quickly exited Latin America, driving up lending rates. The 
Central Bank of Ecuador’s lending rate rose from under 30% in 1997 to over 50% by 
the end of 1998. Spillover effects from the Asian Financial crisis and the sharp fall in 
oil export prices from $20/barrel in early 1997 to around $7/barrel in December, 1998 
made the government’s debt position unsustainable and helped initiate the crisis 
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(Quispe-Agnoli & Whisler, 2006; Jacome H., 2004; Beckerman & Solimano, 2002; 
Beckerman, 2001).
 2
   
 In January 2000, President Jamil Mahuad announced that Ecuador would fully 
dollarize, converting the Sucre at a rate of 25,000 Sucre to the dollar. Soon after, the 
military deposed Mahuad. Although the coup was ultimately unsuccessful, Mahuad did 
not return to office. Gustavo Noboa, Mahuad’s former vice-president, took power and 
passed the legislation authorizing formal dollarization through congress in September 
2000 (Quispe-Agnoli & Whisler, 2006).
3
  
Dollarization is different from a currency union in several key aspects. Dollarization 
is the adoption of a foreign currency, typically the U.S. dollar, as the sole, legal 
domestic tender.
4
 In essence, dollarization is a credible, one-to-one fixed exchange rate: 
credible because dollarization may be irreversible. It is thought to be irreversible 
because to de-dollarize the central bank must float a new currency, repurchase the 
existing stock of dollars, and convince depositors that the sins of the past that 
necessitated dollarization are never to be repeated (Ize & Levy-Yeyati, 2003).  This 
latter point, in particular, may prove impossible, as financial dollarization is highly 
persistent, well after the end of high inflation periods. 
By dollarizing, Ecuador entered a de-facto currency union with the United States. 
Under a currency union, each member country agrees to utilize a single currency, issued 
                                                 
2
 Proceeds from oil exports generated 25-30% of government revenue. 
3
 In some sense, this legislation represented public policy catching up to financial reality.   In 1999, 
53.7% of deposits and 66.5% of loans were in denominated in dollars, but five years earlier only 15.6% 
of deposits and 20.3% of loans were dollar denominated (Beckerman, 2001).  To put the 1999 figures into 
perspective, the stock of dollar deposits in 1999 was eight times larger than Sucre denominated deposits 
(Jacome H., 2004).      
4
 Throughout this paper, it is understood that dollarization refers to a country adopting the U.S. dollar as 
its sole, legal tender.  Countries may enact this type of financial and transactional currency substitution by 
formal agreement with the dollar nation or unilaterally.   
10 
 
by a central bank that distributes the seigniorage revenue across all members and 
considers the economic situations and outlooks of each member when setting monetary 
policy. Under dollarization, the U.S. Federal Reserve remits all seigniorage to the U.S. 
Treasury and sets monetary policy according to its dual mandate and the economic 
conditions of only the United States. Consequently, by dollarizing, Ecuador forfeits 
monetary policy as an economic tool. 
 In 1991, Argentina established a currency board in the form of a one-to-one hard 
peg with the U.S. dollar with, as is characteristic of currency boards, unlimited and on 
demand convertibility between the peso and the dollar at the one-to-one peg. Currency 
boards, of this type, are similar to dollarization, however; Argentina retains nominal 
control over its currency. We say, nominal, because under the convertibility system the 
Central Bank of Argentina can only expand the monetary base to the degree that it 
collects extra dollars. Consequently, the currency board forces Argentina, like Ecuador, 
to inherit U.S. monetary policy. In contrast to Ecuador, Argentina showed in 2002 that 
currency boards are reversible. 
 
Synthetic Counterfactuals and Inference Testing 
When assessing treatment effect of dollarization on inflation and real per-capita 
GDP, we would ideally observe the adopting country both with the treatment of 
dollarization and at the same time without this policy change. Since this is impossible 
and dollarization is a policy not randomly assigned to countries, then we must find a 
way to identify a proper counterfactual for the treated country.  
11 
 
In an ideal experiment on could compare Ecuador and Argentina to a counterfactual 
Ecuador and Argentina that are identical except the counterfactual countries never 
dollarized. If we could observe both, then the difference in their outcome data, Yit, after 
dollarization would simply be the treatment effect. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡, where D=1 in the post-dollarization period. (1.1) 
 
The Synthetic Counterfactuals Method (SCM), developed by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and extended by Abadie et al., (2010), offers a data driven method 
for generating this counterfactual Ecuador, 𝑌𝑖𝑡
?̂?. We provide an outline of the method 
below, using Ecuador as an example.  
First, we take a set of potential control countries that are never treated and do not 
experience a spillover effect from Ecuador dollarizing. We pick our control countries 
such that for some of the countries the value of their outcome variables (e.g. per-capita 
RGDP, etc.) is less than Ecuador’s and for some it is greater than Ecuador’s.
5
 This is 
necessary to create, using weighting matrices, a synthetic country that closely 
approximates Ecuador’s outcome data in the years before dollarization. Formally, to 
avoid extrapolation outside of the support of our data, we choose countries such that 
Ecuador’s data falls within a convex hull of our control group’s outcome data.
6
  
Second, we select a series of explanatory variables with predictive power for our 
outcome of interest. Here we use the second set of weights, with the same restrictions as 
                                                 
5
 Throughout this article, we assume the so-called stable-unit-treatment assumption (Rosenbaum & Rubin 
1983) holds for all of the countries used to form our synthetic Ecuador.  Put simply, this means there are 
no spillover effects from Ecuador to the countries in our synthetic pool after Ecuador dollarizes. 
6
 We also restrict weights to be nonnegative and to sum to one to prevent extrapolation outside the 
bounds of the data. Abadie et al., (2010) elucidate the technical details. 
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above, to assign each variable’s relative importance in predicting the outcome of 
interest. We choose both sets of weights to minimize the mean squared prediction error 
between Ecuador’s outcome of interest and the Synthetic’s in the pre-dollarization 
period. Once we have selected our weights, we generate the synthetic data over the 
entire sample period. In theory, if the synthetic’s data deviate only slightly from 
Ecuador’s in the pre-dollarization period, then the counterfactual may be reasonably 
expected to approximate what Ecuador would have looked like without treatment 
(i.e.𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 ≈ 𝑌𝑖𝑡
?̂?). In this case, any difference between the synthetic’s data and Ecuador’s 
in the post-dollarization period would be attributable to the causal impact of 
dollarization. 
Abadie et al., (2010) propose a series of placebo or falsification tests to strengthen 
the argument that the treatment causes the observed difference in the outcome data 
between the treated country and untreated synthetic. First, we check that the deviation 
we see between Ecuador’s data and the synthetic’s after the pre-intervention period is 
not due to poor out-of-sample properties of our synthetic counterfactual. We do this by 
shortening the training period of our model. If we do not immediately see a deviation 
between the synthetic’s data and Ecuador’s, then we have evidence that the deviation 
between the two datasets is not due to poor out-of-sample fit. 
Next, we use the SCM to form a synthetic for each of the countries in the control 
country pool. Because they never received the treatment, one can think of these as 
placebo exercises. We then check if, for each placebo country, the synthetic’s data 
diverges from control country’s in the post-intervention period. In this falsification test, 
we use the same list of variables and training period to form each control country’s 
13 
 
synthetic that we utilize to create Ecuador and Argentina’s synthetics. The idea is that if 
the treatment has an impact on our outcomes of interest in the treatment country, then 




To judge the magnitude of the treatment effect of dollarization on the outcomes of 
interest, utilize Pitman’s Permutation Test (Pitman, 1937a & 1937b). The Permutation 
Test allows me to test if the average difference between the value of the outcome of 
interest for a treated country’s and its synthetic in the post-treatment period is 
significant. Theory predicts dollarization and quasi-dollarization will reduce inflation so 
we utilize the one-sided variation of the Permutation Test. That is we reject the null 
hypothesis if the difference between country’s test statistic and the average of the 
control countries’ test statistics is negative and in the lowest 5% of the rank order. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the predicted effect of dollarization and quasi-
dollarization on per-capita RGDP is ambiguous. Consequently, we use a two-sided 
hypothesis test.  
For the Permutation Test, we construct the following tests statistics. First, we 
consider the post-treatment period average deviation between the treated and synthetic 





(∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖?̂?
𝑇
𝑡=1 )  (1.2) 
 
                                                 
7
 We further perform a restricted version of this falsification test by limiting our sample to the placebo 
countries where the pre-intervention fit of the synthetic placebo to the placebo’s observed data, measured 
by RMSE, is at least as good as the fit of the synthetic treatment country’s model to the observed 
treatment country’s data. 
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Here 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is country i’s the observed data in period t and 𝑌𝑖?̂? is the synthetic country 
i’s data in period t. For real per-capita GDP, we have ten years of post-treatment data 
for both Argentina and Ecuador. For log inflation, we have eight years of post-treatment 
data for Argentina and ten years for Ecuador. Next, we split our post-treatment sample 
into two halves. Using this split sample, we generate the average deviation between the 
treated and synthetic country for the first half the treatment period and again for the 
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By splitting our sample in this way, we are able to see if dollarization and quasi-
dollarization affect inflation and per-capita RGDP in a delayed manner. 
 
Data and Sample 
The SCM process requires selection of a potential pool of control countries that 
have economic processes similar to our treatment countries of interest, Ecuador and 
Argentina. Additionally, the control countries can never receive the treatment, 
dollarization, or spillover effects from the treatment. Consequently, we exclude 
countries that engage in currency substitution, adopt currency boards, or join a 
monetary union.  
15 
 
As a measure of inflation, we use national CPI data from the IMF’s IFS database. 
The Argentina and Ecuador’s inflation data exhibit massive positive swings, as high as 
3000%, over the pre-intervention period. Therefore, we take the natural log to smooth 
out the data. As right hand side variables in our prediction equation for Argentina’s 
annual inflation –actually the natural log of inflation— we use inflation, population 
growth, and the ratio M2 to GDP (table 1.1).
8
 We have a pool of fifty-seven control 
countries. From the pool of control countries, the SCM algorithm selected two 
countries, Bolivia and Peru, to form our synthetic Argentina. The SCM algorithm gives 
Bolivia a weight of 19% and Peru a weight of 81%. Table 1.2 shows the average value 
of the inflation predictors over the pre-treatment period. For each of these predictors, 
Argentina and the synthetic Argentina have almost the same average value (table 1.2). 
This shows on these observable predictors, the synthetic is similar to the actual 
Argentina. 
To predict Ecuador’s annual inflation, we use population growth and the ratio of 
government spending to GDP. Additionally, annual inflation, in the control countries, 
                                                 
8
 Readers may notice that we do not use the same predictors for each treated country. This is because we 
are not trying to test hypotheses about causal relationships between individual right hand side variables 
and our outcomes of interest. As we are only trying to match optimally the pre-treatment period outcome 
data of our treated countries with their synthetics, this leads to some predictors being in one country’s 
equation but not in another country’s equation.   
 
Additionally, we use outcome data from control countries as a predictor for treated country outcome 
variables. For example, we use inflation data from control countries as a predictor of inflation for 
Ecuador and Argentina.  Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) discuss the case of using the outcome variable 
as a predictor variable in the appendix.  They argue it is best to use the outcome variable along with 
determinants of the outcome in the right hand side of the prediction equation. We take this approach. 
Using the prediction equations for inflation as an example, it is correct to say that inflation from the 
control countries is not a predictor of inflation in Ecuador or Argentina in the traditional sense that 
inflation in the control countries may determine inflation in the treated.  Rather, we include control 
countries' inflation as a predictor variable because including inflation greatly improves the fit of our 
synthetic models, which would make sense if there were some underlying process that helps determines 




enters as a predictor four times: once averaged over the entire pre-treatment period and 
again averaged across control group countries in 1991, '95, and '99 (table 1.3). We 
construct our synthetic from the pool of thirty-seven countries. From these, the SCM 
algorithm assigns positive weights to the Democratic Republic of Congo (.9%), Kenya 
(23.9%), Nicaragua (7.2%), Norway (.8%), Papua New Guinea (11%), and Turkey 
(57.1%). Table 1.3 shows the synthetic Ecuador and Ecuador are similar across the 
predictors of inflation.   
As predictors of Argentina’s real income, we use control countries per-capita 
RGDP, averaged over the entire pre-treatment period; per-capita RGDP in each of the 
years 1982, 1985, and 1990; M2 to GDP; inflation; and openness, the ratio of the sum 
of exports and imports to GDP. To predict Ecuador’s real per-capita GDP, we use 
control countries per-capita RGDP, averaged over the entire pre-treatment period; per-
capita RGDP in each of the years 1989, 1995, and 1999; M2 to GDP; inflation; and 
openness, the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. (Table 1.4)   
From a pool of fifty-seven control countries, the SCM algorithm picks use the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (15.3%), Iceland (.1%), Peru (37.3%), Trinidad and 
Tobago (4.8%), and Venezuela (42.5%) to form our synthetic Argentina. For synthetic 
Ecuador, we use the Democratic Republic of Congo (33%), Gambia (7.2%), Norway 
(.7%), Sudan (36.5%), and Venezuela (20.7%) to construct the synthetic Ecuador. Both 
synthetic Argentina and synthetic Ecuador closely approximate actual Argentina and 
Ecuador, respectively, on the predictors of per-capita RGDP. (See tables 1.4 & 1.5)
9
  
                                                 
9
 One may be concerned about including Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the control 
pool, as they frequently experience war. However, because both countries were engaged in conflict over 




Argentina enacted its currency board-convertibility system in 1991. We have data 
on the predictors of inflation and per-capita RGDP for Argentina from 1980. Therefore, 
the SCM uses the eleven years of predictor data, 1980-1990, and the country weights 
listed above to calibrate the model and generate the synthetic. For Ecuador, which 





In the top panel of figure 1.1, we graph Argentina’s log inflation (solid line) against 
the synthetic Argentina’s (long dotted line). The vertical line at 1991 indicates when 
Argentina established its currency board-convertibility system. Argentina and the 
synthetic track closely throughout the pre-treatment period, but the two series diverge 
after 1991. Following currency board adoption, Argentina’s log inflation is lower than 
that predicted by the synthetic’s inflation throughout the entire eight-year post-treatment 
period. 
To test the out-of-sample properties of the synthetic model, we shorten the training 
period to 1984, seven years before Argentina actually implemented the currency board. 
We allow the synthetic model to estimate its weighting matrices using data from 1980 
to 1983. The top panel of figure 1.2 shows the synthetic correctly matches Argentina’s 
observed data relatively closely through 1986 suggesting that the deviation between the 
two data sets is not due to poor out-of-sample properties of our synthetic model. 
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Next, we check if the divergence between Argentina and synthetic Argentina’s log 
inflation series is large using the placebo-falsification test. We display the results of this 
placebo test in the top panel of figure 1.3. Thirty-eight placebo countries’ synthetics fit 
their respective data at least as well as synthetic Argentina fit Argentina’s log inflation 
data. Compared to the placebo countries, Argentina’s log inflation falls sharply after 
quasi-dollarization. For more than half of the placebo countries, inflation increased 
relative to their synthetics after 1991. Around six countries experienced negative 
divergences in log inflation as large as Argentina’s and only three had sustained down 
breaks in inflation. This provides visual evidence that the down break in Argentina’s 
inflation rate after 1991 is due to the adoption of the currency board. 
The permutation test results (top panel of table 1.7) show that the average deviations 
of Argentina’s log inflation from its synthetic over the entire post-intervention period is 
negative and significant at the 10% level. More importantly, the effect is negative and 
significant at the 5% level the last four years of the treatment period. This is evidence 
that the effect of quasi-dollarization occurs with delay and builds over time. 
 
Real Income 
In the top panel of figure 1.4, we plot Argentina’s real income (real per-capita GDP) 
(solid line) against the synthetic’s (long dotted line). The vertical line at 1991 indicates 
when Argentina implemented the currency board. The synthetic, for the most part, 
closely tracks Argentina’s real income data during the pre-treatment period. The two 
series diverge in 1991. In the period following the implementation of the currency 
board-convertibility system, Argentina’s real per-capita GDP rises markedly above that 
19 
 
predicted by the synthetic Argentina. In the late 1990’s, the results indicate each 
Argentine is $1000 richer than he/she would have been had Argentina never adopted the 
convertibility system. 
Figure 1.5, top panel, shows the results of the currency board adoption move test. 
We end the training period at 1986, five years before Argentina adopted the currency 
board. The two series follow each other closely through 1990, the year before Argentina 
adopted the currency board. This provides visual evidence that the deviation between 
the two data sets in the post-training period is not likely to be due to poor out-of-sample 
properties of our synthetic model. 
We display the results of the placebo test in the top panel of figure 1.6. Thirty-eight 
placebo countries’ synthetics fit their respective data at least as well as synthetic 
Argentina fit Argentina’s real income data. In this Figure, the divergence between 
Argentina’s per-capita RGDP and its synthetic’s, appears larger than the divergence 
between most of the placebo countries and their synthetic’s data. The results of the 
permutation test (table 1.7); however, show the average deviation is not statistically 




The bottom panel of figure 1.1 shows Ecuador’s observed log inflation (solid line) 
against the synthetic Ecuador’s (long dotted line). The vertical line at 2000 indicates 
when Ecuador dollarizes. Ecuador’s log inflation began diverging from the synthetic’s 
in 1998 due to the economic crisis Ecuador experienced from late 1997 through early 
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2000. The crisis was not only one of Ecuador’s most intense economic crises, but also, 
it was more severe than crisis affecting any of the control pool countries. This 
divergence peaks at around one log point in 2000. Following dollarization, inflation 
rapidly declines and ultimately falls below synthetic Ecuador in 2002, and it remains 
below the synthetic throughout the rest of the sample period. 
To test the out-of-sample properties of the synthetic model, we shorten the training 
period to 1994, six years before Ecuador actually dollarized. We allow the synthetic 
model to estimate its weighting matrices using the data from 1980 to 1993. Figure 1.2, 
bottom panel, shows the synthetic tracks Ecuador’s observed data relatively closely 
through 1997 providing evidence that the deviation between the two data sets is not due 
to poor out-of-sample properties of our synthetic model. 
Next, we check if the divergence between Ecuador and synthetic Ecuador’s log 
inflation series is large using the placebo-falsification test. We present the results of this 
test in the bottom panel of figure 1.3. Fourteen control countries’ synthetics fit their 
respective data at least as well as synthetic Ecuador fit Ecuador’s log inflation data. 
Compared to the placebo countries, Ecuador’s log inflation falls sharply after 
dollarization. For more than half of the placebo countries, inflation increased relative to 
their synthetics. Only about four countries experienced negative divergences in log 
inflation as large as Ecuador’s and none were sustained as long.  
The permutation test results (top panel of table 1.7) show that while the average 
deviations of Ecuador’s log inflation from its synthetic over the entire post-intervention 
period and the first half of post-treatment period are not statistically significant, the 
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average deviation in last half of the post-treatment period, -.86 log points, is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This indicates the effect of dollarization occurs with delay. 
 
Real Income 
In the bottom panel of figure 1.4, we graph Ecuador’s observed real income (real 
per-capita GDP) (solid line) against the synthetic Ecuador’s (long dotted line). The 
vertical at 2000 indicates when Ecuador dollarizes. Ecuador’s real income began 
diverging from the synthetic’s in 1998 due to the shocks described in the previous 
section. The divergence peaks at around $120. Following dollarization, real income 
converges with the synthetic’s in 2003 and surpasses it until 2005. Afterwards, real per-
capita GDP falls relative to synthetic Ecuador’s throughout the remainder of the sample 
period. 
To test if the observed deviation between the Ecuador and synthetic Ecuador’s real 
income is due to poor out-of-sample properties of the synthetic model, we truncate the 
training period at 1993, seven years before Ecuador actually dollarized. We allow the 
synthetic model to estimate its weighting matrices using the data from 1980 to 1992. 
Figure 1.5, bottom panel, shows the synthetic tracks Ecuador’s observed data relatively 
closely through 1998 providing evidence that the deviation between the two data sets is 
not due to poor out-of-sample properties of our synthetic model. 
Next, we check if the divergence between Ecuador and synthetic Ecuador’s real per-
capita GDP series is large using the placebo-falsification test. We display the results of 
this placebo test in Figure 1.6, bottom panel. Sixteen control countries’ synthetics fit 
their respective data at least as well as synthetic Ecuador fit Ecuador’s real per-capita 
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GDP data. Compared to the placebo countries, Ecuador tracks the synthetic Ecuador 
quite closely for the first six years of the post-intervention period, then begins to 
diverge sharply. While the picture is illustrative, it is not formal evidence for statistical 
significance. The bottom panel of table 1.7 shows the results of the permutation test. 
The average deviations of Ecuador’s real per-capita GDP from its synthetic over the 
entire post-intervention period, the first half of post-treatment period, and the last half 
of the post-treatment period are not significantly different from zero. The p-values in all 
three cases are near .9 so we have evidence that we are seeing true zero effects, rather 
than insignificant effects due to large standard errors. 
 
Discussion: The Long-Run Sustainability of Dollarization 
Argentina and Ecuador adopted similar monetary policies, enjoyed statistically 
significant reductions in inflation and, surprisingly, had no adverse shocks to real per-
capita GDP, relative to their synthetic counterfactuals. However, the long-run outcomes 
could not be more different. Fourteen years on, Ecuador is still prospering under 
dollarization and shows no signs of de-dollarizing. Argentina, after defaulting on $132 
billion dollars of outstanding debt, abandoned the currency board in January 2002, 
allowing the peso to float.  Scholars have argued that Argentina’s currency board was 
ultimately unsustainable because the central government was unable to institute fiscal 
disciple at the federal and provincial level resulting in persistent deficits and rapidly 
rising debt-to-GDP levels. Moreover, when Argentina pegged to the dollar, it over-
valued the peso and compromised its international competitiveness. Finally, Argentina’s 
labor markets were too inflexible in wages to adjust to external shocks so adjustments 
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came in the form of rising unemployment and, commensurately, poverty rates increased 
throughout the 1990’s (Krueger, 2002; Blustein, 2005). 
Figure 1.7 shows, with the exclusion of 1993, Argentina ran an overall budget 
deficit every year it had the currency board, averaging 2.7% of GDP per year over the 
decade from 1991 to 2001. Furthermore, the data illustrate that neither the provincial 
governments nor the federal government were able to control spending over this period. 
Furthermore, government spending to GDP increased fourfold from 3.3% in 1991 to 
14.2% in 2001. As Figure 1.7 illustrates, this was not a gradual rise, but a discrete 
increase in 1993.  These two trends necessitated extensive borrowing, primarily from 
the international market in dollars. (See Blustein (2005) for a detailed description.) 
External debt to GDP increased twenty percentage points from 34.6% in 1991 to 55.7% 
in 2001. As a percentage of exports, typically a major source of hard currency tax 
revenue for paying external dollar denominated debt, external debt interest payments 
trended from 18% in 1991 to 30.5% in 2000. 
To finance external debt payments, an economy needs to be running a trade surplus 
so the government can use export tax revenue to make scheduled interest payments. 
Unfortunately, Argentina ran a trade deficit for the entire decade it operated under the 
currency board, 3% of GDP on average (See middle panel of figure 1.7). Figure 1.7 also 
shows the Peso-Dollar real exchange rate, calculated using average CPI’s, against 
Argentina’s current account balance-to-GDP ratio, in percentage points. In real-terms, 
the peso appreciated 25% from 1990 to 1991, when Argentina pegged to the dollar. At 
its peak value in 1996, the peso was 41%, in real-terms, more valuable than in 1990. 
The graph provides visual evidence of a connection between the real appreciation of the 
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dollar and the deterioration of the current account balance. Krueger (2002) and Blustein 
(2005) argue the appreciation of the Peso coupled with lagging labor productivity 
growth, relative to regional export competitors, cause a decline in Argentina’s 
international competitiveness. This hints at a need to consider carefully one’s monetary 
anchor.  
Given fixed exchange rates, the economy adjusts to shocks through the labor 
market, either in terms of changes in unemployment or wages, or both. At the time of 
the currency board, Argentina’s unions dominated the labor market and collectively 
bargained at the sector level. Moreover, collective bargaining agreements automatically 
renew if at the end of a giving contracting period the unions and firms cannot agree to 
new terms. Consequently, firms have no flexibility in adjusting wages in response to 
economic shocks, and unions have no incentive to negotiate in good faith with firms 
(IMF, 1998; Economist, 1998; World Bank, 2000).  
Given these sticky wages, labor markets adjusted to reduced competitiveness by 
substituting away from labor and towards capital. (Krueger, 2002) The bottom panel of 
figure 1.7 shows the national average unemployment and under-employment rates. In 
1991, the unemployment rate is 6% but steadily rises to a zenith of 18.1% in 2001, the 
year Argentina defaulted on a major portion of its debt. The World Bank (2000) points 
out that because Argentine labor markets was so inflexible, companies took to hiring 
people as part-time workers, not subject to the full fringe benefits required under union 
contracts. We see this in the data as well. Notice that the under-employment rate rises 
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This paper does not argue against viability of currency boards, in general, but in 
Argentina’s specific case it is difficult to imagine now a scenario where Argentina 
could have maintained the currency board given its persistent deficit spending, over-
valued currency, peg to a non-major trading partner, and inflexible labor market. In 
contrast to Argentina, Ecuador has maintained a level of fiscal discipline that has 
allowed it to pay down its external debt from 73% of GDP in 2000 to 20% in 2012. 
Correspondingly, the interest payments to exports ratio was only 2.7%, down from 13% 
in 2000. Given Ecuador formally dollarized, it does not have a mismatch between its 
revenues and its debt so maintaining a positive current account balance is not as critical, 
as in Argentina’s case. Still here too, Ecuador outperforms Argentina. From 2000 to 
2009, Ecuador ran a current account deficit-to-GDP ratio of .78%. 
The World Bank (2010) attributes much of Ecuador’s early success in the steady 
rise in oil prices since 2000, from around $30/barrel in 2000 to nearly $100/barrel in 
2014,
11
 and its fiscal responsibility laws. President Noboa enacted these laws as part of 
the reforms to institute dollarization. These laws created the Oil Stabilization Fund and 
earmarked oil revenue for specific government development projects, including 
infrastructure building in oil producing region. The Ecuadorian government uses the Oil 
                                                 
10
 One school of thought argues that fiscal imbalances and labor market inflexibility are only proximate 
causes for the unsustainability of Argentina’s currency board. Calvo (2001) and Calvo et al., (2004) argue 
that foreign capital flow reversals, or Sudden Stops, leading to a rapid rise in the real exchange rate is the 
root cause of the crisis that motivated Argentina to abandon its currency board. However, Calvo (2003) 
shows higher liability dollarization increases the probability of a Sudden Stop. Moreover, even 
researchers from this school of thought agree the fiscal deficits and labor market inflexibility exacerbated 
the crisis making fiscal discipline and labor market flexibility relevant policy goals (Calvo, 2001; Calvo 
and Mishkin, 2003). 
11




Stabilization Fund to service outstanding government debt and finance social programs 
(Cueva, 2008).  Since dollarizing, petroleum has constituted over 50% of Ecuador’s 
exports, by revenue, and other primary commodities an additional 25%.
12
 Consequently, 
a sudden decline in commodity prices would quickly deteriorate Ecuador’s current 
account and fiscal positions (World Bank, 2010). 
As far as the choice of nominal anchor, Ecuador’s primary export is oil, and oil 
contracts are denominated almost entirely in USD. (Mileva & Siegfried, 2007) 
Additionally, Ecuador chose to currency substitute using the dollar because the country 
was already highly financially dollarized in 1999 so in that sense the change in 2000 
was public policy recognizing the de-facto situation.  Still there is the question of when 
Ecuador dollarized, did it convert Sucre to Dollars at a rate that ensured an 
appropriately valued real exchange rate? When the government formally converted over 
to dollars, it purchased Sucre at 25,000 to the dollar. This implies a real exchange rate, 
using CPI, of about 25,500 for the post-dollarization period from 2000 to 2012. 
Therefore, we can say the Ecuadorian government was effective at strategically 
devaluing when it dollarized.  
In terms of labor market outcomes, Ecuador’s unemployment has fallen since 
dollarizing in 2000. In 1999, unemployment was 14.4% but fell to around 7.8% in 2007 
and remained at about that level through 2011. 
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Using the SCM, we are able to estimate the effect of Ecuador’s dollarization policy and 
Argentina’s currency board on inflation and real per-capita GDP. The policies prove 
remarkably successful in taming inflation, when compared to a synthetic counterfactual 
country. In Argentina, the currency board reduced inflation, relative to the synthetic 
Argentina, -2.74 log points, on average for the period 1995-1998. In Ecuador, the 
average effect was -1.04 log points, for the period 2006-2010. In both cases, the effect 
appears only after several years. Interestingly, in contrast to previous research on the 
topic, we find neither policies hurt real per-capita GDP so neither country faced an 
inflation abatement-income trade-off.  
Despite these results, the long-term outcomes are vastly different between the two 
countries. Because Argentina was unable to maintain a balanced budget, adopted an 
over-valued exchange rate, and could add sufficient flexibility to its labor market, 
Argentina could not maintain the currency board. It defaulted on large portions of its 
debt in 2001 and broke the peg in 2002.  Ecuador, by comparison, strategically 
devalued when it dollarized so ensure its real exchange rate benefited its export 
industries. Ecuador has adjusted its fiscal spending levels such that it has paid down its 
external public debt from 70% to GDP to 20% to GDP. 
We conclude that while dollarization and quasi-dollarization, in the form of a 
currency board, are effective methods of controlling inflation, for a currency board to be 
sustainable in the long-run, governments must implement structural adjustments to 
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To Fix or To Float: Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Pre-Crisis 





Introduction     
One major concern for a developing country on a high or steady growth path is a 
sudden crisis precipitating a growth reversal.  While developed countries, such as the 
United States, tend to return to trend growth, excepting the 2008 financial crisis, most 
developing countries do not.  Therefore, many researchers attempt to explain sudden 
growth accelerations and post-crisis growth stagnation or decline.
13
  Here I address the 
question, “Did a country’s exchange rate regime choice before the Asian Financial 
Crisis affect its subsequent growth path?”  I find that having a de-facto flexible 
exchange rate the year before the Asian Financial Crisis countries had no statistically 
significant impact on the magnitude of the shock to RGDP per-capita but negatively 
affected the post-crisis growth rate of RGDP per-capita.  Moreover, such countries did 
experience higher post-crisis inflation than did countries with pre-crisis fixed exchange 
rates.  
Much of the contemporary empirical research on economic development and 
exchange rate regimes focuses on the effect of exchange rate regimes on long-run trend 
growth or trend growth volatility.
14
  However, we should evaluate the effect of the 
various exchange rate regime types on economic outcomes in tranquil and crisis periods 
separately to test if exchange rate regimes affect a country’s economic performance 
differently according to the contemporary economic conditions.  Though economic 
crises, by type (i.e. liquidity, currency, banking, balance sheet, etc.), are highly 
                                                 
13
 Pritchett (2000); Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005); Jerzmanowski (2006); Cerra and Saxena 




 Calvo and Vegh (1992); King and Levine (1993) Svensson (2003); Edwards and Magendzo (2003, 
2006); Alesina and Barro (2002); Calvo and Mishkin (2003); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003); 
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010); Husain, Mody, and Rogoff (2005); Rose (2011) 
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heterogeneous with respect to their causes and dynamics (Claessens & Kose 2013), the 
evidence suggests that countries with de-facto fixed exchange rates have lower 
probabilities of experiencing an economic crisis.  Moreover, fixed exchange rate 




In previous research on this topic, authors assume that countries cannot select their 
exchange rate regime, but rather that the exchange rate regime is determined 
exogenously, and therefore countries with fixed exchange rates should, on average, be 
appropriate counterfactuals for countries with flexible exchanges rates.  Consequently, 
researchers estimated the treatment effect of exchange rate regime policy using a 
dummy variable.
16
   
If this assumption is incorrect and countries, themselves, endogenously select their 
exchange rate regimes, then flexible exchange rate and fixed exchange rate countries 
may, on average, be different from one another on factors that affect the exchange rate 
                                                 
15
 See Grier & Grier (2001) and Calvo & Miskin (2003) for specific analysis of the effect of exchange 
rate regime selection and recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis.  Domac & Peria (2003) find that 
developing countries with fixed exchange rates have lower probabilities of experiencing a banking crisis 
but recover more slowly.  Tsangarides (2012) found countries with flexible exchange rates recovered 
more quickly from the 2008 financial crisis than fixed exchange rate countries.  Perhaps because flexible 




 Ghosh et al., (1997) find countries with de-jure fixed exchange rates tend to have lower inflation but 
higher real output volatility, though this result seems only to hold for developing countries with little 
access to international capital markets.  Using de-facto exchange rate regime data, (the Levi-Yeyati & 
Sturzenegger classification method) Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) conclude, fixed exchange rates 
are, in emerging market countries, associated with slower growth and higher output volatility.  In a 
review of the literature comparing growth outcomes across multiple de-facto exchange rate classification 
systems, Andrew Rose (2012) concludes cross country variation in exchange rate regime choices across 
similar countries does not correspond to statistically significant differences in macroeconomic outcome 




regime decision and the growth outcomes of interest in this paper.
17
  Consequently, 
previous papers on this topic might suffer from model misspecification and generate 
biased estimates of the treatment effect.  I find evidence that countries do endogenously 
select their exchange rate regimes and failing to account for this endogenous selection 
does produce biased results of the treatment effect of having a flexible exchange rate 
regime before the Asian Financial Crisis. 
This paper builds on the previous research by modeling the decision to adopt or 
maintain a flexible exchange rate regime in 1996, the year preceding the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  Specifically, I use a PROBIT model to estimate the probability, or 
propensity score, that a country will have a flexible exchange rate in 1996.  I then match 
treatment and control countries on their propensity scores.  The propensity score 
matching approach compares countries that are observationally similar across factors 
relevant to exchange rate regime choice at the time when governments are making 
decisions regarding their exchange rate regime, and therefore the method is well suited 
to estimate the treatment effect of regime choice to post-crisis growth outcomes.  I show 
that countries did endogenously select their exchange rate regime type before the Asian 
Financial Crisis, and that the bias from failing to account for this endogenous selection 
is large enough to produce misleading results. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the particulars of the propensity 
score matching method I use to get an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT) of the endogenous exchange rate regime choice.  Sections 3 and 4 
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 As early as 2002, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) forwarded the hypothesis that countries endogenously 
selected their exchange rate regimes, often defending a de-facto exchange rate that diverged sharply from 
the declared exchange rate.  Subsequently, authors have attempted to estimate the regime selection 
decision.  (see Vonhagen & Zhou (2007) and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2010))   
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enumerate the data sources and specific variables employed.  The paper concludes with 
a discussion of results.  
 
Methodology: Treatment Effect and Endogeneity Bias 
In treatment analysis, the goal is to estimate the average treatment effect on all 
of the individuals who received the treatment (ATT).  Unfortunately, the empirical 
econometrician never observes an individual after receiving the treatment and the same 
individual at the same moment in time who has not received the treatment.  Moreover, 
empirical researchers cannot work around the first problem by observing a subject over 
a fixed time-period without the treatment and then over a second fixed time-period, of 
equal duration, observe the individual with the treatment.  This is because other factors 
in the environment that affect the outcome of interest may change over the observation 
period, and therefore, a country before the treatment may not be an appropriate 
counterfactual for the same country after the treatment. 
If the treatment assignment were random, then one could calculate the ATT by 
differencing the average of the outcomes of the treatment group and the average of the 
outcomes of the control group (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).  The primary challenge 
with evaluating exchange rate policy is that countries themselves select their exchange 
rate regimes based on observable country characteristics and expectations of future 
economic conditions.  For this reason, countries that do not enact the policy of interest 
may be, on average, different from countries that do enact the policy on factors that 
affect the outcome of interest.  Therefore, countries that do not enact the policy will not 
be good counterfactuals for countries that do.  Consequently, estimating the ATT of a 
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given exchange rate regime switch via dummy variables in a linear model will produce 
biased results.   
In his seminal work, Rubin (1974) first proposed the method of pair wise 
matching treated and control group individuals in a nonrandom treatment assignment 
study to generate an unbiased estimate of the ATT.  He noted randomization of the 
treatment assignment reasonably ensures that, on average, the treatment and control 
groups are identical in all factors –observed and unobserved– that affect the outcome of 
interest, and therefore the average difference of the treated and control outcomes are an 
unbiased estimate of the ATT.  Likewise, the average difference of pair wise matches of 
treated and control individuals, on the same observable factors, is also an unbiased 
estimate of the ATT.  Unanswered is how to match individuals, given one could 
generate any number of possible matching combinations by changing the weights 
placed on each of the relevant variables.  Moreover, the dimensionality problem of 
matching directly on covariates makes this method untenable as the number of 
covariates grows. 
Rubin and Rosenbaum (1983) operationalized this proposed method by proving 
that matching via a  scalar propensity score based on factors that affect the decision to 
adopt a given treatment and the outcome of interest will achieve the conditions 
necessary to estimate the ATT, unbiasedly in both small and large samples.  These 
requirements are first that conditional on a well specified propensity score model the 
treatment assignment is independent of the potential responses and second that the 
probability of receiving treatment is less than 1 and greater than zero for all 
combinations of characteristic in the sample.  If these two conditions are satisfied, one 
48 
 
can say treatment is strongly ignorable.
18
  Put plainly, these two conditions ensure that 




I offer the following example to illustrate the method.  Suppose we have a 
sample of 100 countries that have adopted a floating exchange rate, and a much larger 
sample of countries, perhaps 1000, which remained fixed.  For now, let us ignore the 
fact that this is six times the number of countries that actually exist.  To estimate the 
treatment effect of this endogenous policy decision on, for example, per-capita RGDP 
growth one year after policy adoption, we can employ the Rubin and Rosenbaum 
matching method as follows.  First, using a vector of observable characteristics we 
believe affect both the decision to adopt the policy and per-capita RGDP growth, we 
estimate the probability that a given country adopts the policy of interest via PROBIT, 
LOGIT, or a linear probability model.  We then match each treated country with a 
country in the control group that has the same, or nearly the same, probability of 
adopting the treatment (i.e. propensity score).  For each treatment-control pair we 
difference the per-capita RGDP growth rates in the year following policy adoption and 
take the average of the differences.   
 
                                                 
18
 Showing that treatment is strongly ignorable is elsewhere referenced as solving the selection of 
treatment on the observables problem (Heckman, et al (1998)) or satisfying conditional independence of 
treatment assignment (Lechner (2002)).  
 
19
 Implicitly, one must also assume the response of unit j to treatment T is independent of treatment given 




Data and Estimation 
I perform my matching estimation of the ATT of having a flexible exchange rate 
regime the year before the Asian Financial Crisis via the following two-step procedure.  
First, I estimate the probability a sample country has de-facto flexible exchange rate in 
1996, the year before the Asian Financial Crisis.  Second, I match each flexible 
exchange rate country with a fixed exchange rate country with a similar propensity 
score of having a flexible exchange rate in 1996, and difference the post-crisis outcomes 
of interest: RGDP per-capita, RGDP per-capita growth, and inflation.  The average of 
the differences for each outcome of interest across all matched pairs is the ATT of 
having a flexible exchange rate regime on the outcome variables in the post-crisis 
period. 
There are a number of competing methods for classifying a country’s exchange rate 
regime.  The IMF provides a list of de jure (i.e. country declared) regimes, but previous 
works have revealed that de facto exchange rate regimes diverge markedly from the de 
jure.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) (LYS), and 
Ghosh, et al (1997) elucidate just a few of the competing classification methods.   
In both of these classification schemes, countries are finely divided by degrees of 
flexibility of the exchange rate: free floating, managed float, crawling peg, or hard peg.  
Because of my sample size of approximately 100 countries, I do not use a multinomial 
PROBIT to estimate the various treatment effects of a range of non-fixed exchange 
rates to the base case of a fixed exchange rate.  Rather I define a country as having 
flexible exchange rate if a country has either a pure or a managed float.  I list my 
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sample countries by 1996 Reinhart & Rogoff exchange rate regime in table 2.1 and by 
1996 Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger exchange rate regime in table 2.2.  
A number of papers provide guidance on model selection for predicting exchange 
rate arrangement decisions.
20
  Utilizing these insights, I estimate the probability that a 
country adopts a flexible exchange rate in year t, using a PROBIT model (equation 
(2.1)) and the variables presented in table 2.3.  To avoid contemporaneous endogeneity 
between the left-hand side and right-hand side variables, I lag the right hand side 




In this equation, CA is a country’s current account balance to GDP.  CA should be 
positively correlated with having a flexible exchange rate, as large swings in current 
account balance would constitute a sudden shift foreign reserves stocks, making a fixed 
exchange rate more difficult to maintain (Krugman 1979).   
The Chinn-Ito index (CI) captures the degree of capital account openness in a given 
country for a given year (Chinn & Ito (2006)).  Previous studies find countries with 
more stringent capital controls are more likely to have fixed de facto exchange rate 
regimes (Carmignani, et al (2008), Edwards (1996), and Von Hagen & Zhou (2007).  
 My measure of a country’s financial development (FINDEV) is M2 to GDP.  One 
would expect that developing countries with flexible exchange rates are more likely to 
attract savings and foreign investment, as the country risk related to sudden devaluation 
                                                 
20
 Carmignani, et al (2008), Edwards (1996), Edwards & Magendzo (2003, 2006), Holden, et al (1979), 
Melvin (1985), and Van Hagen & Zhou (2007) 
𝑃(𝐷 = 1|𝑥)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑂𝑀𝑆𝐻𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡 
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is less frequent and more predictable in the case of fixed exchange rate countries.  
Empirically, higher financial development is correlated with having a fixed exchange 
rate regime (Edwards (1996), and Von Hagen & Zhou (2007).   However, Carmignani, 
et al (2008) define financial development as M2 over M1 and find this measure is 
negatively correlated with having a de facto fixed exchange rate. 
OPEN is the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, and it measures the 
contribution of trade to a country’s economy.   According to Optimal Currency Area 
(OCA) theories, as countries increase their trade openness, they should enjoy greater 
benefits from adopting fixed exchange rates (Alberto & Barro (2002), Mundell (1961), 
and Carmignani, et al (2008)).  Indeed, some empirical studies find greater trade 
openness is positively correlated with adopting a fixed exchange rate (Edwards (1996), 
Edwards & Magendzo (2003, 2006), and Carmignani, et al (2008)).  OPEN is also a 
proxy for how exposed a country is to external shocks.  One would expect that countries 
more exposed to external shocks would be more likely to adopt a flexible exchange rate 
regime to allow adjustments to occur in the exchange rate and not in the factors of 
production markets.  Supporting this view, Von Hagen & Zhou (2007) find trade 
openness is positively related to adopting a flexible exchange rate.   
Relatedly, the size of an economy should also be positively correlated with adopting 
a fixed exchange rate.  Given a fixed level of openness, the larger the economy the more 
international transactions it will have so the greater the benefits of eliminating foreign 
exchange transaction costs related to adopting a common currency (Alberto & Barro 
(2002) and Mundell (1961).  The variable SIZE is the natural log of real GDP in billions 
of USD and captures the size of a country’s economy.  LEVEL is natural log of real 
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GDP per-capita and proxies the country’s standard of living.  Empirical results are 
mixed: SIZE is positively correlated with a country adopting a flexible exchange rate 
(Carmignani, et at (2008) and Von Hagen & Zhou (2007)), but LEVEL is negatively 
correlated with adopting a flexible exchange rate (Edwards (1996) and Von Hagen & 
Zhou (2007). 
The variable RES is the country’s stock of foreign currency reserves to GDP.  
Empirically countries with higher stocks of foreign reserves are more likely to adopted 
fixed exchange rates. (Edwards (1996), Von Hagen & Zhou (2007)) 
Inflation (INF) is the annual percentage change in the GDP deflator, and NOMSHK 
is the absolute deviation of M2 growth from the four year moving average of M2 
growth.  Both Edwards (1996) and Von Hagen & Zhou (2007) find these variables are 
positively correlated with adopting a fixed exchange rate.   
These data for the PROBIT model all come from the World Banks World 
Development Indicators database, except NOMSHK, which I calculate as in Edwards 
(1996), and the Chinn-Ito index. 
I present the results of my PROBIT estimations in table 2.4.   The results are mostly 
consistent with previous findings and across exchange rate regime classification 
methods.  CA is insignificant under the R&R classification regime but negatively 
correlated with having a LY&S de facto floating regime.  As expected, greater capital 
account restrictions reduce the probability of having a flexible exchange rate regime.  
Contrary to Edwards (1996) and Von Hagen & Zhou (2007), I find greater financial 
development is positively correlated with having a flexible exchange rate regime in 
1996.  Trade openness is significant in both estimations but with opposite signs.  Size 
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and Level are as expected.  RESERVE, NOMSHK, and INF are all statistically 
insignificant. 
After estimating the probability of having a flexible exchange rate regime in 1996, I 
use this propensity score to match treatment group countries with a country in the 
control group with the closest propensity score.  I then calculate the mean differences of 
outcomes of interest, using these matched pairs. 
There are many ways to match treatment and control group countries based on their 
estimated propensity scores: one-to-one nearest neighbor, radius matching, inverse 
propensity score matching, etc.  I find that I achieve the identification requirements 
when I match via one-to-one nearest neighbor or inverse propensity score matching 
using a Gaussian kernel.   
In the second method, a treatment group member’s outcome is compared to a 
weighted average of nearby treatment group members’ outcomes.  The weight is 
proportional to a control member’s “distance” from the treatment group member, in 
terms of the difference of their propensity scores.  This matching method is preferred to 
other matching methods in cases where there are many individuals in the control group 
(Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder, 2003).  Therefore, I report the Gaussian kernel-weighted 
matching results in the table and figures section, though the one-to-one matching results 
are qualitatively the same. 
 
Results 
First, I compare the mean values across my treatment and control groups for each of 
the regressors from my PROBIT model to show that the unmatched fixed exchange rate 
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regime countries are not an appropriate counterfactual for the flexible exchange rate 
regime countries.  The results in tables 2.5 and 2.6 show that several of the means of the 
right hand side covariates are statistically different from one another when we conduct 
an unmatched control-treatment group comparison.
21,22
   
Notice in the R&R case, the average values of two of the right-hand side variables 
for the treatment group are statistically different from the corresponding average value 
of the control group at the 95% level.  In the LYS case, there are two such regressors, 
and four at the 90% level.  This means the treatment and control group are different, on 
average, from each other on variables that affect the outcomes of interest.  
Consequently, any estimation of the ATT via a dummy variable for exchange rate 
regime type would generate a biased and inconsistent result. 
Next, I show I, indeed, have a properly specified propensity score model that 
accounts for the selection into the treatment group on observable factors.  There are two 
methods to check if I have empirically satisfied the conditions of strong ignorability of 
treatment.   
                                                 
21
The reader may wonder using a long pre-crisis period to estimate the coefficients on the PROBIT model 
may be inappropriate because of either high persistence in exchange rates regime choices over time or 
because of the existence of other economic crisis over this period.  I re-estimated my PROBIT model 
using only 1996 data and found estimates of the treatment effect that are not qualitatively different from 
those described in this section.   
 
22
Readers may worry about slippage or movement between the treatment and control group after the onset 
of the Asian Financial Crisis.  Because this paper investigate the effects of a country’s choice of exchange 
rate regime in 1996, only, and matches control and treatment countries on the 1996 propensity scores, it is 
unnecessary for me to account for treatment assignment slippage during the crisis.   
 
If, for example, a country fixed in 1996 and due to the crisis had to break the peg, which resulted in a 
higher interest rates or capital flight and thus lower post-crisis period economic growth, vis-à-vis a 1996-
pegged country, then my paper would attribute this result to the country’s exchange rate regime choice in 
1996.  From the standpoint of my framework, any actions a floating exchange rate regime country is 
forced to take after 1996 that affects RGDP per-capita, per-capita RGDP growth, or inflation is part of the 
ATT of selecting a floating exchange rate in 1996.  If I have properly matched, then I have controlled for 
relevant pre-crisis differences between countries so any post-crisis differences represent the treatment 
effect.   
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As a first pass, I inspect the distributions of the propensity scores.  Figures 2.1-2.2 
illustrate, in both the R&R and LYS cases, the considerable overlap of the two 
distributions.  The area of overlap represents the set of control and treatment countries 
that are identical, on average, on the observables, except for treatment status.  
Specifically, the area of overlap represents the subsample of paired countries where 
each has the same, or nearly the same, probability of adopting the policy but only one 
actually adopts the policy.  Therefore, between the two countries in each treatment-
control pair treatment assignment is random.  This large area of overlap means I have 
many comparable pairs from which to draw inference. 
As a formal check that the control and treatment samples are on average identical, I 
consider tables 2.7 and 2.8.  These tables show the differences of the average of the 
matched and unmatched treatment-control samples for each regressor for the two de-
facto exchange rate regimes.  If the average of the differences of each of the covariates 
is not statistically different from zero, then we have evidence that treatment assignment 
is strongly ignorable (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).  In this case, we say the covariates are 
balanced. 
For the R&R sample (table 2.7), when I match the groups via inverse propensity 
score weighting, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no mean difference for all 
regressors at the 91% level.  For the LY&S sample (table 2.8), I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no mean difference for each of the right-hand side covariates at the 76% 
level, and in most cases at even lower levels.  Therefore, I conclude by matching on 
these covariates, I have accounted for this endogenous selection on these observables 
and have made these groups, on average, identical on the relevant, observable factors.  
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More importantly, this means endogenous selection on these observables into the 
treatment group will not bias my estimates of the ATT.   
Overall, I find in the immediate aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (i.e. 1997-
2002), countries with de-facto flexible exchange rate regimes before the crisis fared no 
better than countries with pre-crisis fixed exchange rate regimes in terms of level RGDP 
per-capita but did suffered slower post-crisis RGDP per-capita growth.  Furthermore, 
countries with pre-crisis flexible exchange rates suffered slightly higher post-crisis 
inflation in the five years immediately following the crisis, though this result differs 
across exchange rate regime classifications. 
As a way of seeing the importance of accounting for endogenous selection, I present 
both the matched and unmatched results in table 2.9. The matched results are 
consistently insignificant in all years and across both de-facto exchange rate regimes.  
However, for the R&R sample, the unmatched ATT estimates are statistically 
significant at the 99% level and positive for all years.  This is an example of the bias 
one can encounter from failing to account for endogenous selection into the treatment 
group. 
As for post-crisis RGDP per-capita growth rates (table 2.10), a country’s pre-crisis 
exchange rate regime has a statistically significant and mostly negative effect on post-
crisis growth.  This result is robust to the type of de-facto exchange rate considered.  
Furthermore, across both exchange rate regime samples, failing to account for 
endogenous selection biases the estimates of ATT towards zero.   
In the matched R&R estimates, the treatment effect is negative and significant at the 
99% level in 1999 and 2001.  In 2002, the treatment effect is significant and negative at 
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the 90% level.  Notice across these three years, countries with flexible exchange rates 
grew, on average, 2.1 percentage points slower than countries with fixed exchange rates 
in 1996.  The unmatched estimate of the treatment effect is not statistically different 
from zero across all years. 
 In the matched LY&S estimates, the treatment effect is negative and significant at 
the 95% level in 1999, at the 99% level in 2001, and at the 90% level in 1997.  Over 
these three years, countries with flexible exchange rates grew, on average, 2.2 
percentage points slower than countries with fixed exchange rates in 1996.  In 1998, the 
treatment effect is positive and significant at the 95% level.  The unmatched estimate of 
ATT is only significant and negative in 2000, a year when the matched estimate of ATT 
is not statistically different from zero.   
Finally, we consider inflation (see table 2.11).  These results are not robust across 
exchange rate regime classification schemes in terms of the direction and size of the 
ATT of pre-crisis exchange rate regime selection on post-crisis inflation.  Additionally, 
the direction of the bias varies across exchange rate regime classifications.   
In the R&R de-facto exchange rate regime case, countries with pre-crisis flexible 
exchange rates experience statistically significant higher inflation in the fourth year 
after the crisis.  The matched estimate of the inflation differential (7.43%) between the 
control and treatment countries is higher than the dummy variable estimate (3.27%), 
which is not statistically different from zero.   
In the LYS de-facto estimates, I find no corresponding statistically significant 
inflation differential in the fourth year.  In fact, the estimated treatment effect of having 
a flexible exchange rate in 1996 on post-crisis inflation rates is not statistically 
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significant at the 95% level in any year.  In the unmatched estimates, however, we see 
that countries with flexible exchange rates suffer higher inflation, about 8.6 percentage 
points, than pre-crisis fixed exchange rate countries in 1998, the year immediately 
following the crisis.  Here again we see an attenuation bias from failing to account for 
endogenous selection into the treatment group.  
Overall, I conclude that for this particular crisis and for the countries in this sample, 
having a de-facto flexible exchange rate regime in 1996 did not affect the magnitude of 
the shock from the Asian Financial on post-crisis RGDP per-capita or post-crisis 
inflation, but did cause treatment countries to grow more slowly relative to their 1996 
fixed exchange rate counterparts. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have shown having a flexible exchange rate before the crisis did not 
insulate RGDP per-capita from the effects of the crisis.  Moreover, countries with de-
facto, floating exchange rate regimes the year before the crisis, recovered more slowly.  
Perhaps equally important, I find that in 1996 de-facto flexible and fixed exchange rate 
regime countries are, on average, statistically different from one another on variables 
that affect the outcomes of interest.  Moreover, failing to account for these differences 
produces biased results that are, in some cases, significantly different from matching 
results that account for selection of exchange rate regime on observable factors.  The 
sign of the bias is not, however, consistent in direction across outcomes of interest. 
These findings have two implications.  First, the results of the previous empirical 
research on this topic are not robust to relaxing the assumption that a country’s de-jure 
59 
 
or de-facto exchange rate regime is exogenous.  Second, my results argue against 
making the policy prescription for flexible exchange rate regimes based on the 
justification that countries with flexible exchange rates recover more quickly from 
economic crises.  Of course, these results are only generalizable to the countries in my 
sample and for crises identical to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
In my continuing research on this topic, I would like to consider other crisis of 
various types to investigate if these results are generalizable to all crisis types.  We 
know that the causes, dynamics, and economic impacts of crises are variable depending 
on their type (i.e. liquidity, currency, banking, balance sheet, etc.) (Claessens & Kose 
2013).  Therefore, while we might expect exchange rate regime selection to affect post-
crisis economic growth in the case of a financial crisis marked by speculative currency 
attacks and sudden current account reversals, such as the Asian Financial Crisis.  We 
may find that exchange rate regimes do not have statistically significant impact on post-
crisis recover after banking crisis, unless the trigger is a rise in the value of foreign 
currency denominated debt, or in the case of a balance sheet recession initiated by the 
bursting of a housing bubble, a spike in non-performing loans, and high consumer 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: PROBIT Regression Results: 
Adoption of Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
  
R&R: De-Facto LYS: De-Facto 
  
(1) (2) 




















































Log Likelihood   -792.13 -798.05 
S.E. statistics in parentheses 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Breaking the fall: Does Pre-Crisis Exchange Rate Regime Soften the 




Introduction     
One major concern for a developing country on a high or steady growth path is a 
sudden crisis precipitating a growth reversal.  While developed countries, such as the 
United States, tend to return to trend growth, excepting the 2008 financial crisis, most 
developing countries do not.  Therefore, many researchers attempt to explain sudden 
growth accelerations and post-crisis growth stagnation or decline.
23
 With respect to 
exchange rate regimes as a policy tool, much of the contemporary empirical research on 
economic development and exchange rate regimes focuses on the effect of exchange 
rate regimes on long-run trend growth or trend growth volatility.
24,25
  However, given 
that catch-up growth is frequently stymied by economic crises, the relevant question is, 
“Are there exchange rate policies that help insulates countries from currency crises?”  
Research exploring the link between exchange rate regime choice and the likelihood 
of currency crisis has shown that countries with floating exchange rates or managed 
floating exchanges are more prone to speculative attacks and currency crises.
 26
  If fixed 
exchange rate regimes are associated with a lower frequency or likelihood of a currency 
crisis, then the next important policy question is, “Conditional on experiencing a 
currency crisis, does having a fixed exchange rate mitigate the intensity of the crisis?” 
                                                 
23
 Pritchett (2000); Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005); Jerzmanowski (2006); Cerra & Saxena 
(2008); Jones & Olken (2008); Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2011); Berg, Ostry, & Zettelmeyer (2012) 
24
 Calvo & Vegh (1992); King & Levine (1993) Svensson (2003); Edwards & Magendzo (2003, 2006); 
Alesina & Barro (2002); Calvo & Mishkin (2003); Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2003); Beetsma & 
Giuliodori (2010); Husain, Mody, and Rogoff (2005); Rose (2011) 
25
 Ghosh et al., (1997) find countries with de-jure fixed exchange rates tend to have lower inflation but 
higher real output volatility, though this result seems only to hold for developing countries with little 
access to international capital markets.  Using de-facto exchange rate regime data, (the Levi-Yeyati & 
Sturzenegger classification method) Levi-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2003) conclude, fixed exchange rates 
are, in emerging market countries, associated with slower growth and higher output volatility.  In a 
review of the literature comparing growth outcomes across multiple de-facto exchange rate classification 
systems, Andrew Rose (2012) concludes cross country variation in exchange rate regime choices across 
similar countries does not correspond to statistically significant differences in macroeconomic outcome 
variables, such as economic growth and inflation. 
26
 See Esaka (2010) for specific results and a review of relevant literature. 
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Despite the importance of this question, only a handful of case-studies have investigated 
the effect of a country’s pre-crisis exchange rate regime on immediate post-crisis 
outcomes. 
These case-studies reveal several common macroeconomic factors influence the 
intensity of a currency crisis and the speed of recovery. Sachs, et al., (1996) and Tornell 
(1999) find crisis intensity, defined as the weighted average of the depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate with respect to the USD and the percent decrease in foreign 
reserves, of the Tequila and Asian crises is greater in countries with higher credit 
expansion and lower foreign reserve levels in the pre-crisis period. Frankel & Rose 
(1996) show currency crises are more likely to occur when output growth is low, 
domestic credit growth is high, and foreign interest rates are high. In terms of post-crisis 
outcomes, Hong & Tornell (2005) examine factors that affect recovery from currency 
crises in the post-Bretton Woods period and find higher credit expansion before the 
crisis slows post-crisis GDP growth while greater reserve adequacy before the crisis 
accelerates recovery. Most of this literature does not explore the role of a country’s pre-
crisis exchange rate regime.  
The few articles that do control for a country’s pre-crisis exchange rate regime tend 
to analyze a specific crisis or crisis period. For example, Grier & Grier (2001) find that 
having a fixed exchange rate at the onset of the Asian financial crisis failed to limit the 
extent of devaluation during the 1997 crisis and exacerbated the shock to the stock 
markets by approximately 40 percentage points. Also investigating the Asian financial 
crisis, Hallren (2014) concludes that having a fixed exchange rate in 1996 reduced 
subsequent income growth and weakly increased inflation. Finally, during the recent 
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2008 financial crisis, countries with flexible exchange rates recovered more quickly but 
suffered no differential shock to GDP (Tsangarides, 2012). 
I contribute to this literature by investigating the effect of a country’s pre-crisis 
exchange rate regime on real income, stock market returns, and inflation in the initial 
year of and the two subsequent years of the crisis across all currency crises in the post-
Bretton Woods period to 2005. Moreover, I only include countries that actually 
experience a currency crisis, according to an empirical definition. Previous research on 
this topic tends to analyze a given crisis and investigate the impact across all countries. 
Therefore, I am investigating factors that affect the intensity of a crisis conditioning on 
a country being a crisis whereas previous works only condition on being in a general 
crisis period but include countries in their sample that were unaffected. My approach 
allows me to isolate the partial effect of pre-crisis exchange rate regime choice on crisis 
intensity and recovery. Only conditioning on being in a general crisis period means that 
the counterfactual for countries with pre-crisis pegged exchange rates that actually 
experience a currency crisis are both countries that did experience the crisis and had a 
pre-crisis flexible exchange rate, as well as, countries with pre-crisis flexible exchange 
rates but that did not suffer a currency crisis.
27
 
Using data from 1972 to 2005 and a sample of developing countries, I find that 
countries with fixed exchange rates suffer greater shocks to real income during and 
immediately following a currency crisis than their counterparts with pre-crisis flexible 
exchange rates. However, I also find that countries with fixed exchange rates and those 
with flexible exchange rates the year before a crisis are, on average, different from one 
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 I am estimating  𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 1, 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1, 𝑋) − 𝐸(𝑌|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 0, 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1, 𝑋). 
Previous works estimate𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 1, 𝑋) − 𝐸(𝑌|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 0, 𝑋). 
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another on factors that affect the outcomes of interest. Once I account for these 
differences using propensity score matching, I show that having a fixed exchange rate at 
the onset of a currency crisis does not affect post-crisis real income, stock returns, or 
inflation relative to comparable counterfactual countries with pre-crisis flexible 
exchange rates.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the theory, data, estimation, and 
results from my investigation of the impact of having a fixed exchange rate the year 
before a crisis on currency depreciation. Section 3 through 5 contains similar sections 
related to my estimation of the impact of a country’s pre-crisis exchange rate regime on 
stock market returns, real income, and inflation, respectively. Section 6 concludes.  
 
Currency Depreciation & Currency Crises 
Theory 
The first stage of my analysis is to investigate if having a fixed exchange rate before 
a currency crisis insulates an economy from major swings in the exchange rate. Since 
an important goal of establishing a pegged exchange rate is to stabilize the exchange 
rate at a constant value, it is important to verify a pegged exchange rate is effective at 
accomplishing this policy goal during a crisis. If countries with pegged exchange rates 
at the on-set of a crisis experience less currency depreciation during the crisis than 
floating exchange rate countries with similar economic fundamentals, then the peg is 
effective at maintaining a stable nominal exchange rate during a crisis.  If countries with 
pegs before a crisis experience no more depreciation than that predicted by 
fundamentals, then I would conclude that although the peg is not effective at 
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maintaining a constant nominal exchange rate, abandoning the peg does not exacerbate 
the currency depreciating effect of a currency crisis. If countries with pre-crisis fixed 
exchange rates suffer greater currency depreciation than countries with pre-crisis 
floating exchange rates with similar economic fundamentals, then not only is the peg 




I analyze countries that actually experience a currency crisis in the post-Bretton 
Woods period. To identify if a country suffers a crisis, I utilize three data driven 
definitions of currency crisis and one for speculative attack. I include in my sample 
every country-year in which a country experiences a currency crisis by any of the four 
definitions.
28
 To further isolate the sample to developing and emerging market 
countries, I only include countries with real income of less than $10,000. The crisis data 
come from Frankel & Rose (1996), Kraay (2003), Hong & Tornell (2005), and Laeven 
& Valencia (2013). Each author or authors identify crisis years as follows. 
Sachs, et al. (1996) identify currency crisis via a crisis index that is a weighted 
average of the percent change in the real exchange rate and the percent change in 
foreign reserves. To identify a crisis if in two or more quarters of a given year, the crisis 
index is more than two standard deviations below its meaning. For countries that meet 
the currency crisis criteria for several continuous years, Hong & Tornell (2005) use the 
first year of each three-year window to avoid double counting a single crisis.  
                                                 
28
 This pooled approach is necessary to generate a sample size sufficiently large to perform my 
estimation. Where possible, I did split the sample by definition and found the results to be robust to the 
type of crisis definition used. 
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Frankel & Rose (1996) define a currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of the 
currency vis-a`-vis the U.S. dollar of at least 20 percent that is also at least 10 
percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation in the year before. They compute 
exchange rate depreciation as the percent change of the end-of-period official nominal 
bilateral dollar exchange rate from the IFS database of the IMF. For countries that meet 
the currency crisis criteria for several continuous years, Frankel & Rose (1996) use the 
first year of each three-year window to identify the crisis.  
Similar to this definition, Laeven & Valencia (2013) define a currency crisis as a 
nominal depreciation of the currency vis-a`-vis the U.S. dollar of at least 30 percent that 
is also at least 10 percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation in the year 
before. Laeven & Valencia (2013) compute exchange rate depreciation as the percent 
change of the end-of-period official nominal bilateral dollar exchange rate from the 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) database of the IMF. For countries that meet the 
currency crisis criteria for several continuous years, they use the first year of each five-
year window to identify the crisis.  
Kraay (2003) identifies a successful attack if the monthly devaluation in the nominal 
exchange rate is higher than 10% (5% for OECD countries) and the average absolute 
percentage change in the 12 months prior to that month is smaller than 2.5% (1% for 
OECD countries). He identifies a failed attack as the month in which there is at least a 
50% (25% for OECD countries) decrease in non-gold reserves and a 50% (25% for 
OECD countries) increase in nominal money market interest spreads over the US 
Federal Funds and is not followed by a large devaluation for at least 3 months. To avoid 
double-counting prolonged successful (failed) attacks, Kraay eliminates large 
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devaluation events (spikes in reserves and interest spreads) preceded by events in any of 
the prior 12 months. In my analysis, I include countries that experienced a speculative 
attack, regardless of the result of the attack. 
To sort countries by exchange rate regime, I utilize the Reinhart & Rogoff (2004) 
(R&R), de-facto classification method. The key parameter of interest in my prediction 
equation of currency depreciation during the initial year of a currency crisis, in year T, 
and the two following years is δ. I estimate this equation three times: year T, year T+1, 
and year T+2. 
𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖 𝑇+𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝑿𝒊𝑻−𝟏
′ 𝜷 + 𝛿𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑇−1 + 𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑗 ∈ [0,2] (3.1) 
In this equation, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 are macroeconomic variables that help predict currency 
depreciation. Previous papers in this literature offer clear guidance on relevant 
predictors of currency depreciation.
29
 Based on these insights, I include one year lagged 
values of currency depreciation, current account balance to GDP, external debt to GDP, 
M2 to foreign reserves, the five year percent change of the ratio claims on the private 
sector of deposit money banks to GDP, and the five year percent change in the real 
exchange rate. The five year percent change in private lending controls for a boom in 
private lending in the immediate pre-crisis period. Data for these variables come from 
the IMF’s IFS database, except for the real exchange rate data. The real exchange rate 
data come from the USDA’s trade weighted real exchange rate database.  
Peg is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country has a fixed exchange rate the 
year before it suffers a currency crisis. Therefore, the parameter δ is the average 
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 Furman & Stiglitz (1998), Kaminsky, et al. (1998), Radelet & Sachs (1998), Corsetti, et al.(1999), 




treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of having a fixed exchange rate immediately 
preceding the onset of a currency crisis.
30
 
I estimate equation (1) via ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. This 
framework will generate an unbiased estimate of the ATT of having a fixed exchange 
rate the year before a crisis if, on average, the treated and control group countries are 
observationally similar across determinants of the outcome of interest. As a method of 
checking the assumption of endogenous treatment selection, I utilize propensity score 
matching to identify control group countries that are, on average, observationally 
equivalent to treated group countries on all determinants of our outcomes of interest, 
except for treatment status.  
To do this I estimate a probit equation using the determinants of currency 
depreciation with Peg as the dependent variable.  I then use the propensity scores from 
each equation and match treated and control group countries that are, on average, 
similar on factors that affect our outcomes of interest. The average of the differences for 
each of the outcomes of interest across all matched pairs is an unbiased estimate of the 
ATT of having a fixed exchange rate regime, conditional on the determinants (Rubin, 
1974; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983 & 1985; Heckman, et al., 1998; Dehejia, 2005). One 
must remember we are not formally modelling the decision to adopt a pegged exchange 
                                                 
30
 Readers may worry about slippage or movement between the treatment and control group after the 
onset of a crisis.  Because this paper investigate the effects of a country’s choice of exchange rate regime 
leading into a crisis it is unnecessary for me to account for treatment assignment slippage during the 
crisis.   
 
If, for example, a country fixed in 1996 and due to the crisis had to break the peg, which resulted in a 
higher interest rates or capital flight and thus lower post-crisis period economic growth, vis-à-vis a 1996-
pegged country, then my paper would attribute this result to the country’s exchange rate regime choice in 
1996.  From the standpoint of my framework, any actions a floating exchange rate regime country is 
forced to take after 1996 that affects currency depreciation or stock market returns is part of the ATT of 
selecting a floating exchange rate in 1996.   
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rate. Rather we are using the probit model to match countries that are similar on 
determinants of currency depreciation.   
 
Results 
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics by pre-crisis exchange rate regime type. The 
table illustrates that fixed and floating exchange rate regime countries are different from 
one another on M2 to foreign reserves at the 10% significance level and pre-crisis 
currency depreciation at the 35% p-level. Table 3.2 presents the estimates of the 
treatment effect. Columns (1), (3), and (5) are the OLS estimates and columns (2), (4), 
and (6) are the non-parametric, with respect to currency depreciation, matching 
estimates. The OLS estimates indicate having a fixed exchange rate before a currency 
crisis has not effect on currency depreciation during or following the crisis, except in 
the second year following the crisis. In this year, countries with pre-crisis fixed 
exchange rate countries experience currency appreciation of 6.53% over what is 
predicted by relevant macroeconomic fundamentals. The propensity score matching 
(PSM) results, by contrast, are not statistically different from zero in any year. This 
shows the importance of accounting for average differences in the determinants across 
the treated and control group. My results indicate that countries with pegged exchange 
rates before a currency suffer the same amount of currency depreciation as countries 
with pre-crisis flexible exchange rates and similar economic fundamentals. This null 
result does not mean that having pegged results has no effect on currency depreciation. 
Rather these results mean that pegged exchange rates are no better than flexible 
exchange rates at maintaining stable nominal exchange rates. To the extent that 
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governments adopt pegs to keep nominal exchange rates fixed, these results indicate 
pegs are not effective.   
 
Currency Depreciation & Stock Market Returns 
Theory 
I analyze the effect of currency depreciation on stock market returns in the first year 
of a currency crisis. Following the examples of Gallinger (1994), Poterba & Samwick 
(1995), Leigh (1997), and Grier & Grier (2001), I utilize stock returns as a leading 
indicator of real GDP growth. In so far as markets are forward looking and reflect 
current firm profitability, it is reasonable to assume that equity market returns are a 
good proxy of future economic performance.  
Grier & Grier (2001) offer several insights into how currency depreciation might 
impact the real economy. Currency depreciation could impact equity returns in one of 
three ways. First, if firms are fully hedged against swings in the exchange rate, then 
currency depreciation would have little impact on firms’ profitability and thus no 
significant effect on equity returns. If the Marshall-Lerner conditions are satisfied, then 
a nominal depreciation of the exchange rate would improve a country’s trade balance, 
increase GDP growth, and thereby positively affect stock market returns.  
If a country suffers an unexpected and uncontrolled depreciation of the exchange 
rate, firms and/or the central government are highly indebted in foreign currency 
denominated loans, and firms are insufficiently hedged against swings in the exchange 
rate, then the real increase in the debt burden resulting from the depreciation in the 
exchange rate will negatively impact government balance sheets and firm’s 
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profitability. The latter will directly depress stock market returns. Moreover, if the rise 
in the real debt burden prompts a decline in investor confidence and capital flight, then 
the economy further suffers rising interest rates and additional currency depreciation 
(Dornbusch, et al.,1995; Chang & Velasco, 2000; and Aghion, etal., 2001). This 
scenario is mostly likely when a country has a fixed exchange rate at the onset of the 
crisis, a real exchange rate that is over-valued, and a high degree of foreign currency 
denominated external debt (Krugman, 1979; Obsfeld, 1986; Mishkin, 1999).   
 
Data/Estimation 
I estimate equation (2) where the parameter δ measures the ATT of pre-crisis 
pegged exchange rate on stock returns during a currency crisis. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 𝑇+𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑇−1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑇−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑇−1 + 𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑗 ∈ [0,2]  (3.2) 
The findings of Grier & Grier (2001) motivate the selection of explanatory variables 
as their study of the effect of pegged exchange rates on equity returns during the Asian 
financial crisis is the most comparable work to this general case. The annual stock 
return data (RET) come from Nicholas Bloom of Stanford University and cover 60 
countries (Baker & Bloom (2013)).
31
 I augment the Bloom data with stock return data 
for Singapore and Hong Kong from Yahoo Finance. As before, I use currency 
depreciation data from the IMF’s IFS database, the R&R exchange rate classification 
method, and the crisis year definitions described previously.  
I estimate this equation using OLS with heteroskedastic robust standard. The fixed 
and floating exchange rate countries are on average similar across both determinants: I 
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 The Bloom data is quarter-on-quarter returns. Through a conversion from the Canadian Statistics 




failed to reject the null of a mean difference in the determinants between the fixed and 
floating countries at the .4 p-level (table 3.3). However, I am able to improve covariate 
balance via matching, and therefore, do perform the robustness check of estimating the 
treatment effect via propensity score matching.  
 
Results 
Overall, the results show having a pegged exchange rate at the onset of a currency 
crisis has no differential effect on stock returns during the initial year of the crisis or the 
two subsequent years. (See table 3.4.) The one exception is that the PSM estimate in the 
second year following the crisis shows having a fixed exchange rate before the crisis 
caused equity returns to follow 15% more than for similar pre-crisis flexible exchange 
rate countries. Nevertheless, the results indicate that conditional on equity returns and 
currency depreciation before the crisis, the peg neither exacerbated nor diminished the 
effect of the crisis on stock market returns. In so much as equity returns are a leading 
indicator, these results suggest a pegged exchange rate neither hurts nor helps a country 
recover from a currency crisis.  
This is an interesting result for two reasons. First, although Grier & Grier (2001) 
show pre-crisis pegged exchange rates exacerbated the impact of the 1997 Asian crisis 
on equity markets, I find that, in-general, this result does not hold when we consider all 
currency crises from 1972 to 2005 and only countries that actually experienced a crisis, 
rather than analyzing all countries during a specific crisis period. Second, whereas 
papers that analyze the effect of exchange rate regimes on long-term growth in the post-
Bretton Woods period tend to find that countries with hard pegs growth mores slowly, 
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my results indicate that having a peg before a currency crisis does not impede a 
country’s economic performance.  
 
Currency Crisis & Real Income 
Theory 
Previous empirical work on pre-crisis exchange rate regime and recovery of the real 
economy tend to show that fixed exchange rate countries recover more slowly than 
countries with flexible exchange rates that suffer the same crisis (Calvo and Miskin, 
2003; Domac and Peria, 2003; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2005; and Tsangarides, 2012). However, the most comparable article to 
this paper, Hallren (2014), provides evidence that countries with a fixed exchange rate 
before the Asian Financial Crisis do not suffer a greater shock to real income than 
comparable countries with a pre-crisis flexible exchange rate. Moreover, he finds pre-
crisis pegged countries recover more quickly than pre-crisis floating exchange rate 
countries. The results deviate from previous research on the subject because Hallren 
(2014) allows for non-random sorting of countries between exchange rate regimes. 
Here I utilize the same model as in Hallren (2014) to test if the results are robust to 
isolating the sample only to countries that actually experience a currency crisis rather 






I estimate equation (3) where the parameter δ measures the ATT of pre-crisis 
pegged exchange rate on real income during a currency crisis. 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑌𝑖 𝑇+𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝑿𝒊𝑻−𝟏
′ 𝜷 + 𝛿𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑇−1 + 𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑗 ∈ [0,2]  (3.3) 
The matrix (X) includes standard macroeconomic determinants of real income used 
in the literature to estimate the effect of exchange rate regime on real income.
32
 These 
variables include: CA, a country’s current account balance to GDP; financial 
development (FINDEV), M2 to GDP; trade openness (OPEN); the natural log of real 
GDP in billions of USD (SIZE), which captures the size of a country’s economy; 
natural log of real GDP per-capita (LEVEL), a proxy for the country’s standard of 
living; reserves to GDP (RESERVE); inflation (INF); and the deviation of M2 growth 
from the four year moving average of M2 growth (NOMSHK). I draw the data from the 
World Bank’s WDI and IMF’s IFS databases.  I sort countries by their pre-crisis R&R 
exchange rate regime classification and use the crisis-year definitions described in 
section 2.  
 
Results 
I present summary statistics of the determinants of real-income in Table 3.5. As 
table 3.5 illustrates, the fixed and floating exchange rate countries differ from on 
another at the 5% level on one determinant and at the 30% level on six determinants. 
This indicates non-random sorting of countries across exchange rate type. 
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 Mundell (1961), Holden, et al. (1979), Krugman (1979), Melvin (1985), Edwards (1996); Alberto and 




I estimate equation (3) using OLS with heteroskedastic robust standard (Table 3.6).  
The estimates indicate the effect of having a pegged exchange rate the year before a 
currency crisis increased the shock to real-income by almost $500 per year. However, 
once I account for covariate imbalance via propensity score matching and compare 
countries that are observationally similar, I find the effect to be no different from zero. 
Moreover, the OLS and matching estimates of the treatment effect are statistically 
different from each other. 
 
Currency Crisis & Inflation 
Theory 
A typical policy objective cited when adopting a fixed exchange rate is price 
stability. When high inflation is the result of accommodative monetary policy and 
profligate government spending, a fixed exchange rate serves as a nominal anchor to 
curb these drivers of inflation, though a review of the literature by Rose (2011) 
indicates no long-run inflation abatement effect of having a pegged exchange rate. 
Moreover, there is always concern the fixed exchange rate will become over-valued, 
lead to an uncontrolled devaluation, and result in a sudden rise in the price of imported 
goods. If imported goods represent a large portion of the domestic consumption basket, 
then a collapse of the fixed exchange rate will increase domestic inflation. 
  
Data/Estimation 
To estimate the effect of a pre-crisis pegged exchange rate on inflation in the 
immediate post-crisis period, I estimate equation (4) where the parameter δ measures 
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the ATT of pre-crisis pegged exchange rate on inflation during and after a currency 
crisis. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖 𝑇+𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝑿𝒊𝑻−𝟏
′ 𝜷 + 𝛿𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑇−1 + 𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑗 ∈ [0,2]  (3.4) 
The matrix (X) includes standard macroeconomic determinants of inflation: 
financial development (FINDEV), M2 to GDP; trade openness (OPEN); reserves to 
GDP (RESERVE); lagged inflation (INF); M2 growth; and the deviation of M2 growth 
from the four year moving average of M2 growth (NOMSHK). I draw the data from the 
World Bank’s WDI and IMF’s IFS databases.  I sort countries by their pre-crisis R&R 
exchange rate regime classification and use the crisis-year definitions described in 
section 2.  
 
Results 
Table 3.7 gives summary statistics of the determinants of inflation. Table 3.7 shows 
the fixed and floating exchange rate countries differ from on another at the 5% level on 
one determinant and at the 30% level on three determinants. This indicates non-random 
sorting of countries across exchange rate type. 
Despite this non-random sorting, both the OLS (columns (1), (3), and (5)) and PSM 
estimates of the average treatment, of having a fixed exchange rate before a crisis on 
inflation during and immediately following a crisis, are not statistically significant at the 
5% level. (See table 3.8.) However, the OLS estimates do show that the effect of having 
an exchange rate before a crisis increased inflation by 6.44% at the on-set of the crisis, 
though this is significant only at the 10% level. The two sets of estimates, OLS vis-à-vis 
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PSM, are statistically different from one another, indicating the importance of 
accounting for non-random sorting of countries between exchange rate regime groups. 
Overall, my analysis indicates that having a fixed exchange rate does not help 
countries better control their prices than a flexible exchange during or immediately 
following a currency crisis. Given this is often one of the stated benefits of a fixed 
exchange rate, this section provides evidence against such a policy. 
 
Conclusion 
Using data on emerging market and developing countries, I analyze the effect of 
having a fixed exchange rate at the onset of a currency crisis on currency depreciation, 
equity returns, real income, and inflation the year of the crisis and the two years 
following the crisis. This paper contributes to the literature by considering all currency 
crises from 1972 to 2005, rather than using a case study approach. Moreover, I focus 
my analysis only on countries that actually experienced a currency crisis or speculative 
attack. Consequently, my results are generalizable across all crises and better isolate the 
ATT of having a peg before a crisis on a country’s performance during the crisis.  
I find a country’s pre-crisis exchange rate regime had no impact on currency 
depreciation during the first year of a crisis. This result is robust to the exchange rate 
regime classification and crisis definition used. This confirms the Grier & Grier (2001) 
results that once we control for key macroeconomic fundamentals, a country’s exchange 
rate has no additional effect on currency depreciation. This null result does not mean 
that having a peg has no effect on currency depreciation. Rather these results mean that 
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pegged exchange rates are no better than flexible exchange rates at maintaining stable 
nominal exchange rates.  
Additionally, I, in general, find no evidence that a pre-crisis fixed exchange rate 
caused, on average, a greater shock to equity returns than similar pre-crisis flexible 
exchange rate countries. This result too is mostly robust across crisis definitions and 
exchange rate regime classifications. This finding is in sharp contrast to the conclusions 
of Grier & Grier (2001) but is likely driven by differences in the samples of countries 
analyzed. 
The effect on real income is slightly less clear. The parametric estimates indicate 
that having a fixed exchange rate before a currency crisis exacerbates the shock of the 
crisis on real income and that this differential impact between pre-crisis fixed and 
flexible exchange rate countries persists for at least two years. However, once I control 
for non-random sorting of countries between exchange rate regime types, this effect 
disappears.  
Finally, a fixed exchange rate regime before a crisis seems to do no better of a job at 
controlling prices during the crisis than a flexible exchange rate, once we control for 
relevant determinants of inflation.  
Ultimately, I conclude that a having a pegged exchange rate before a currency crisis 
does not insulate the economy from the shock of the crisis or accelerate its recovery. 
When considered in light of related research that analyzes the effect of exchange rate 
regime choice and long-run growth, this paper suggests that flexible exchange rates are 
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